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ABSTRACT
The past several years have been marked by a general trend towards increased high-stakes testing
for students and schools and test-based school accountability systems. There are many potential school
responses to testing programs. This paper investigates the potential that schools respond by "gaming the
system" through reshaping the test pool. Using student-level panel data from six large counties in Florida,
we study whether the introduction of the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test in 1996 led schools
to reclassify students as disabled and therefore ineligible to contribute to the school's aggregate test
scores. Employing student-level fixed effect models and a series of secular trends as controls, we find that
schools tend to reclassify low income and previously low performing students as disabled at significantly
higher rates following the introduction of the testing regime. Moreover, these behaviors are concentrated
among the low income schools most likely to be on the margin of failing the state's accountability system.
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Introduction 
Education is currently at the forefront of the nation’s political agenda: everyone, regardless 
of political persuasion, wants to see an improvement in the performance of U.S. schools.  This 
consensus ends abruptly, however, when it comes to determining how to effect such a change in 
performance.  One popular approach is to increase the accountability of schools to the public, by 
assessing schools on the basis of improvements in students’ performance on standardized 
examinations and by offering remedies, such as increased choice (either within the public sector or 
through vouchers for private schools), reconstitution, or closure, in the event of persistent identified 
failure of a school to improve.  Accountability measures have been proposed or implemented in 
dozens of states and going forward will be required in all states.  
On January 8, 2002, President Bush signed into law the reauthorization of the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act, also known as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB).  A 
centerpiece of this education reform involves implementing a system of school accountability.  
States must design systems of school report cards based on the fraction of students demonstrating 
proficiency in reading and mathematics.  Under NCLB, if students do not make adequate yearly 
progress, schools and districts face consequences such as mandatory public school choice and the 
possibility of complete school restructuring, as well as the redirection of federal funds; states risk the 
loss of federal administrative dollars.  Additionally, the classifications or grades formally assigned to 
schools may affect the attractiveness of the local area to potential and current residents and the 
perceptions of local officials by the public.  Figlio and Lucas (2000) provide evidence that housing 
markets are highly responsive to introduction of government-provided school report cards.  Thus, the 
grading of schools using student test data provides numerous incentives for schools to “game the 
system.”     2
Schools may react to these incentives by increasing class time spent on subjects and topics 
that are emphasized in the accountability exams, while decreasing class time on subjects and topics 
either not in or not emphasized in the exams.  It should be noted that this type of strategy may be 
perceived by policy-makers as precisely the desired response to the accountability system, rather 
than as a “gaming” of this system.  Significant class time may also be taken on test-taking strategies.  
Schools may even be less inclined to discourage poorer students from dropping out.  For example, a 
Virginia school district superintendent said that the state’s accountability exam system “actually 
encourages higher dropout rates … It is actually to the school’s advantage to drop slow learners and 
borderline students from the school, because they are usually poor test-takers.” (Borja, 1999)  In part 
because of the newness of school accountability systems, we know of few attempts to seriously 
quantify school responses to these incentives.
1 
Another potential reaction to the incentives created by accountability systems involves the 
classification of students into special education categories exempt from taking the tests used for 
school grading.
2  Schools could potentially improve their state-assigned grade or classification by 
taking their poorest performing students out of the testing pool by classifying them into the special 
education categories exempt from taking the tests.
3  Additionally, the schools could potentially 
improve their state-assigned grade or classification by refraining from classifying better-performing 
students into the special education categories exempt from taking the tests.  The American Institutes 
                                                           
1 Papers that discuss these types of incentives include Elmore et al. (1996), Goldhaber (2002), Ladd (2001) and Koretz 
(1996).  However, these are not empirical studies of school responses to incentives.   A few recent academic papers 
describe school responses to incentives embedded within accountability systems, other than the response described in 
this paper. Figlio (2002) finds that the introduction of accountability exams in Florida has resulted in fewer and shorter 
disciplinary suspensions for poor-performing students during the “cram period” prior to accountability exam testing 
dates.  Figlio and Winicki (2002) show that Virginia schools threatened with sanctions tend to alter their nutrition 
programs during testing periods and substantially increase nutrients clinically shown to boost short-term cognitive 
performance. Jacob (2002) and others present evidence that schools subject to accountability systems may respond by 
retaining marginal students. 
2 The NCLB Act will require special education participation, but for reasons mentioned in the Discussion section of this 
paper, incentives to game the system through the classification of students into special education categories will remain. 
3 States may have other incentives to over-classify students into special education categories.  For example, Cullen 
(2001) found that fiscal incentives could explain nearly 40% of the growth in student disability rates in Texas.     3
for Research’s (AIR) new national study on special education costs helps demonstrate the potential 
flexibility and opportunity that school decision makers have in determining which, if any, special 
education category to place students in.  AIR finds very wide variation in costs and services within 
single special education categories.  In fact they find less than ten percent of the variation in special 
education costs in carrying out Individualized Education Plans can be explained by the 
exceptionality categories in the federal/state indicator record (Chambers et al, 2002).  This implies 
that there may be significant discretion in how to classify individuals with specifically identifiable 
needs.   
In this paper we use highly detailed student-level data to examine whether the initiation of 
the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test (FCAT) has affected Florida public schools’ decisions 
on special education assignments.  Using student-level fixed effects models, we find that following 
the introduction of the FCAT testing program low-performing students and students from low socio-
economic backgrounds were significantly and substantively more likely to be reclassified into 
disability categories exempted from the accountability system.  These differences persist even after 
controlling for a rich set of time trends in disability classification.  We also find that high-poverty 
schools are significantly more likely to reclassify low-achieving students than are more affluent 
schools. 
While ours is the only paper to apply student-level fixed effects models to this topic, we 
know of two other current working papers that describe similar issues.  Jacob (2002), looking at the 
effects of test-based accountability in Chicago, shows that low-achieving students in struggling 
schools are the most likely to be placed in special education, a finding similar to ours.  While Jacob 
does not estimate student fixed-effects models, he does control for prior achievement test scores and 
background characteristics.  Cullen and Reback (2002), using aggregate data and a clever 
identification strategy, exploit the discontinuity in rewards in Texas’s accountability system to show   4
that schools respond to incentives to shape the test pool.  These two papers, taken together with ours, 
present complementary evidence--in three states and with three very different identification 
strategies--that schools respond to the incentive to classify marginal students into special education. 
 
High-stakes testing in Florida 
Beginning in the 1996-97 school year, students in certain grades began to take the Florida 
Comprehensive Assessment Test in reading and mathematics for the purpose of evaluating schools' 
performance in fostering educational achievement.
4  The FCAT tests were designed to align closely 
with the Sunshine State Standards, a set of core knowledge that students in particular grades are 
expected to know.  The tests are challenging, and are generally accepted to be among the more 
comprehensive state-level student assessments.  These tests were initially used by the state to 
identify low-performing schools, and beginning in 1999 were used to grade schools on an explicit A 
through F scale, though this new grading regime was not fully known at the time of our last year of 
testing in the present analysis.  Students in fourth, eighth, and tenth grades were tested in reading 
and writing, while students in fifth, eighth, and tenth grades were tested in mathematics.  No major 
changes occurred to special education financing in Florida over this time period. 
All regular education students are required to take the FCAT examinations, but students in 
only a small number of disability classifications are required to take the exam.  Specifically, all 
speech or language impaired or hospital/homebound students are required to take the FCAT.  But in 
all other disability categories (educable or trainable mentally handicapped, orthopedically impaired, 
deaf or hard of hearing, visually impaired, emotionally handicapped, specific learning disabled, 
profoundly mentally handicapped, dual-sensory impaired, autistic, severely emotionally disturbed, 
traumatic brain injured, or developmentally delayed) FCAT test participation is determined by 
                                                           
4 Students had previously taken the Florida Writes! writing assessment.   5
school personnel and the student's parents in the student's Individualized Education Plan, and test 
scores of all students in these categories are exempted from school accountability programs.  While 
some of these disability categories are clearly more mutable than others, it is certainly possible that 
marginal students may be classified (or de-classified) from some of the exempted categories as a 
result of the testing regime. 
 
Identification strategy and data 
We are interested in investigating the effects of the testing regime on disability classification 
probabilities.  Due to the numerous potential omitted variables problems in this application, we 
utilize panel data and estimate models with student-level fixed effects to capture any time-invariant 
student-level variation in the probability of disability classification.  Therefore, we draw our 
identification from students whose timing of classification switches coincides with the timing of the 
testing regime.  Since some students may be classified in anticipation of testing policy changes and 
others may experience delays in testing-related classification changes, this strategy yields 
conservative estimates of the effect of testing on disability classification.  Because of the possibility 
that different types of students have become more likely to be reclassified into special education 
over time, we also control for linear time trends in disability classification.  We estimate different 
models in which we in turn assume that all students’ classification probabilities trend together over 
time, and in even more highly parameterized models in which we allow linear trends in classification 
probabilities to vary across different types of students or schools.  This strategy should also serve to 
generate conservative estimates of the effects of testing on disability classification, because some of 
the change in disability classification associated with the testing regime would almost surely be 
captured by a time trend.  We also have estimated models that include both attribute-specific linear 
time trends and year effects (to capture any nonlinear time trend in overall classification patterns.)    6
In these models, we cannot estimate an overall testing effect, because the testing regime began at the 
same time for the entire sample.  However, we can still estimate the coefficients on the interaction 
terms between the testing regime and student or school attributes.  In each case, these estimated 
interaction terms are virtually identical to those reported in the paper; therefore, we do not report two 
sets of regression results, and instead report only the set of results where it is possible to estimate an 
overall testing effect.  
Our data come directly from the student records of six large herein-unidentified county-level 
school districts, each among the one hundred largest school districts in the United States.
5  Students 
in these school districts are more likely to be urban and are somewhat more likely to be racial or 
ethnic minorities than would a cross-section of Florida in general, but are large and diverse enough 
to have vast quantities of students of all socio-economic backgrounds, and schools at all levels of the 
socio-demographic spectrum.   
School districts in Florida have uniform reporting requirements, and students are merged 
over time based on social security number, and in the event of no match by social security number, 
by first name, sex, race, and birth date.  Students who change school districts over the study period 
remain in the study provided they relocated to another district included in the project.  For the period 
from 1991-92 through 1998-99, we follow every student in kindergarten through eighth grade for all 
six counties.  School district records include free lunch status, grade, and disability status.  In 
addition, in two of these counties, we observe the student’s Stanford 9 standardized test score for 
nearly every student in each year from 1994-95 through 1998-99.  (Counties vary from year to year 
in which students are tested.  In one county, students were tested beginning in grade one in some 
years and grade two in other years; in the other county, students were tested beginning in grade two 
in some years and grade three in other years.)  All told, our dataset consists of 4,334,284 student-
                                                           
5 Counties participating in this study wish to remain unidentified.   7
year observations.  We observe student background characteristics in 4,171,752 cases, and prior year 
Stanford 9 test scores in 907,577 cases.  (Note that we have substantially fewer observations on prior 
test scores not because of sample attrition—94 percent of students in the two relevant counties have 
test score data—but rather because we only have Stanford 9 test scores for two of the six counties, 
and then for a shorter time window.)   Due to the likelihood of error correlation at the school level, 
we adjust all standard errors for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the school level. 
Table 1 shows the changes in disability classification rates in our population over time.   We 
observe that the overall rate of disability classification increased over the period covered by this 
study.  At the beginning of the study period, 7.3 percent of students were classified as disabled in 
categories that would eventually be test-exempt.  By the end of the period, however, this 
classification rate had increased to 10.8 percent.  While more of the increase in disability 
classification generally occurred following the introduction of the testing regime, there is an 
apparent trend in classification occurring prior to the testing period, implying that our decision to 
control for time trends is a prudent one.  (Of course, some of the pre-testing run-up in disability 
classification could be in anticipation of the introduction of the testing system.)  Table 1 also 
presents these figures for free lunch eligible students (a proxy for likelihood of performing poorly on 
the FCAT examination) and those who are not free lunch eligible.  In the case of the free lunch 
eligible, classification rates increased from 8.7 percent to 10.6 percent in the period prior to the 
introduction of the testing regime, while in the case of more affluent students, classification rates 
remained relatively stable in starting at 6.1 percent and ending at 6.2 percent.  After the introduction 
of the testing regime, the test-excluded disability classification rates increase substantively for both 
groups.   
The left panel of Table 2 describes the transitions into disability classification, by grade, 
before versus after the introduction of the testing regime.  The vast majority of students enter special   8
education during the elementary grades, but one might reasonably expect that if the increase in 
reclassification is occurring as a result of the testing regime as opposed to general trends toward 
increased classification that the third-to-fourth-grade transition would see the largest spike in 
classification following the introduction of high-stakes testing, as fourth grade is the first year of 
testing with consequences for schools.  We observe that there is no statistically significant or 
economically meaningful change in classification transitions from grade-to-grade after versus before 
the testing program’s introduction in any of the elementary school grade transitions, except for the 
transition into fourth grade.  In this transition, we observe increased propensities for students to be 
reclassified into test-exempt special education categories following the introduction of the FCAT 
testing program.  This difference is significant at the one percent level when standard errors are 
adjusted to account for clustering of errors within schools.  
The right panel of Table 2 breaks these transitions out separately for free lunch eligible 
students and more affluent students.  We observe that the post-FCAT increase in disability 
classification during the third-fourth-grade transition is entirely due to increases in classification of 
low-income students.  On the other hand, at no other transition does the post-FCAT effect on 
reclassification ever approach statistical significance for either low-income or more affluent 
students.  This provides some suggestive evidence that schools may be responding to incentives to 
reclassify  certain students as disabled in order to reduce their contribution to aggregate measures of 
test performance.  Of course, whether these effects are causal remains to be seen. 
 
Regression results 
Table 3 describes the estimated effects of the introduction of high-stakes testing on test-
excludable disability classification.  Specification 1 reports the estimated mean effects of the 
introduction of testing, in a model controlling for student-level and grade-level fixed effects, but no   9
time trends.  We observe that the introduction of the FCAT test is associated with an increase in the 
likelihood that a student will be classified as disabled by 5.6 percentage points.  This estimated effect 
is statistically significant at any reasonable level; it is also economically significant, as 8.9 percent of 
the sample of students are identified as having a test-excludable disability, implying that the 
introduction of FCAT testing is associated with a more than 50 percent higher rate of disability 
classification in the six counties in question. 
While schools have a financial incentive to classify students as disabled regardless of 
background, this incentive should be particularly strong for students whom the school views as at 
risk of performing poorly on the standardized examination.  Given that low-income students tend to 
do more poorly on standardized examinations than do higher-income students, one proxy for this 
screen might be free lunch eligibility.  Therefore, the second specification of Table 3 includes an 
interaction term between testing and free lunch eligibility.  We observe that while post-FCAT, the 
classification of more affluent students increased by an estimated 3.6 percentage points, the 
estimated change in classification associated with the change in testing regime is again as great for 
free lunch eligible students.  Specification 3 adds a time trend to the model; here, we observe that 
while the estimated effect of the testing regime for more affluent students falls considerably, the 
estimated difference in the effects for free-lunch and non-free-lunch students remains virtually the 
same, and is still statistically significant at any reasonable level of significance.  Specification 4 
controls for separate time trends for low-income and higher-income students, and again the results 
clearly indicate that low socio-economic-status students are most likely to be reclassified in response 
to the testing policy, even after controlling for a rich set of time trends. 
Specifications 5 through 8 from Table 3 present the results from these same four regressions, 
but only for the two counties where we also have Stanford 9 test scores.  We observe that while the 
results are the same as those reported above, in terms of being strongly statistically significant, the   10
estimated magnitudes of the results, though still quite large, are more modest than in the six-county 
case.  This suggests that the models that follow that look at testing effects by prior test scores rather 
than socio-economic status may also generate relatively conservative estimates of the responses to 
the testing regime.  However, we have no way of knowing for certain whether this is true.  
Specification 9 from Table 4 presents the results from the parallel model to Table 3’s 
Specification 6.  Here, all variables are interacted with the student's Stanford 9 mathematics test 
score from the prior year rather than with free lunch eligibility.  As with Specification 6, this 
specification does not control for time trends.  The drawback of this exercise is that, due to data 
limitations, we can only observe one pre-testing year of data.  But we still observe results that yield 
similar conclusions as the free lunch interactions do: the lower last year's test performance, the more 
likely a student is to be classified as disabled.  Specifications 10 and 11 repeat the same model, but 
in turn add a general time trend, then a time trend interacted with the prior year’s mathematics test 
score.  We see that in both of these specifications, schools tended to increase disability classification 
post-testing disproportionately for students who performed poorly on the prior year’s test.  
Specification 12 from Table 4 presents the identical model as Specification 11 (all fixed 
effects and past-performance-specific trends) but changes the dependent variable to look only at a 
very specific classification decision.  In this model, students are included in this specification only if 
they are either classified as learning disabled or have another disability that does not automatically 
exclude them from testing on the FCAT.  This model is extremely highly parameterized, and because 
of the fixed effects included in the model, identifies the effects of testing entirely on the basis of 
students whose classification switches between learning disabled, and therefore test-excluded, and 
non-excluded disabilities.  Even in this specification, which we present as corroborative evidence, 
the results stay consistently strong in magnitude and statistical significance, indicating that schools 
are more likely to switch low-performers from a test-included to a test-excluded disability following   11
the introduction of the testing regime.  Because of the relatively small number of classification-
switchers, however, the remainder of the paper focuses on disability classification more generally, 
rather than this very specific type of classification decision. 
Specifications 13 and 14 from Table 4 report the results of models in which students are 
grouped by school type, with the notion that certain schools might be more sensitive to a school 
accountability system than are others.  We identify schools as "high poverty" if the school has more 
than the district-wide median fraction of free lunch-eligible students.  Specification 13 controls for 
separate time trends for high-poverty and low-poverty schools, while Specification 14 further 
controls for prior-test-score-specific separate time trends for high-poverty and low-poverty schools.  
We observe that high-poverty schools are significantly more likely to reclassify students than are 
their relatively low-poverty counterparts.  As Specification 14 demonstrates, these results are 
particularly concentrated for previously low-performing students.  In summary, schools that ex ante 
are likely to be more threatened by a test-based accountability system, because they have a larger 
fraction of students likely to perform poorly on the examination, tend to be more aggressive in 
reclassifying previously low-performing students as disabled in an apparent response to the 
introduction of the high-stakes testing program. 
 
Discussion 
We have estimated that the introduction of the high-stakes FCAT testing is associated with a 
dramatically higher rate of disability classification.  We have also determined that the probability 
that a low-performing student or a student from a low socio-economic background would be 
reclassified into a disability category exempted from the accountability system increased 
significantly after the introduction of the high-stakes FCAT examinations.  In addition, we found   12
that high-poverty schools are significantly more likely to reclassify students than more affluent 
schools. 
Altering decisions on special education classification for students reduces the accuracy of the 
grades or classifications given to schools based on the accountability exams and profoundly affects 
the students’ individual educational experience.  Reduced accuracy in the grades or classifications 
given to schools based on the accountability exams reduces the potential effectiveness of public 
policy based upon that data.   
The incentive to place the students likely to perform worst on the state tests into special 
education classes may cause schools to place in special education students whom they believe would 
be better off in other classes.  Since many states have laws that limit the number of students per 
special education teacher, the placement of those students into special education classes who 
otherwise would not have been so placed may require that students who would benefit more from 
special education be prevented from taking special education classes.   
Also, the cost of providing special education far exceeds the cost of traditionally educating a 
student.  According to a new study by the American Institutes for Research, the ratio of spending per 
special education student to spending per regular education student is 1.90 on average.
  (Chambers et 
al., 2002)  Thus, funds could be inappropriately spent on special education for students who may be 
better off in less costly traditional classrooms; schools could potentially spend those funds more 
productively if the incentives to alter special education assignments did not exist. 
The NCLB Act will require that students that are classified into special education categories 
participate and be counted.  Specifically, under the NCLB Act, all students in each defined 
subgroup
6 must meet or exceed the state’s proficient level of academic achievement by the end of 
the 2013-14 school year.  The legislation specifies intermediate goals for meeting this objective.  
                                                           
6 Students with disabilities are one of several defined subgroups.   13
These include each state establishing “statewide annual measurable objectives” that include a “single 
minimum percentage of students who are required to meet or exceed the proficient level on the 
academic assessments.”  These minimum percentages apply separately to each subgroup of students, 
but not all subgroups must make adequate yearly progress each year.  The subgroups that do not 
meet or exceed the minimum percentage still must decrease their percentage of students that are 
below proficiency by 10 percent when compared with the preceding year.
7        
Despite the requirement under the NCLB Act that all subgroups, including students with 
disabilities, be included in the accountability testing system, incentives to game the system through 
special education classification will remain.  First, NCLB does permit testing accommodations for 
students with disabilities.  Accommodations, such as additional time, can potentially aid any 
student’s performance, including those students without legitimate or clear-cut disabilities.  Thus, 
the incentive to over-classify
8 low-performing students and students from low socio-economic 
backgrounds into special education remains.  Also, since all subgroups, including students with 
disabilities, will be required to have the same minimum percentage of members meeting proficiency 
or at least decrease the percentage of non-proficient students by 10 percent annually, schools will 
have the incentive to place “ringers” in the students with disabilities category.  In other words, since 
it will likely be particularly difficult to have the students with disabilities subgroup reach the 
minimum percentage, schools will have a strong incentive to add students to that category who are 
likely to achieve proficiency.  For example, schools would likely improve their probability of 
attaining adequate yearly progress for all subgroups if they were to place relatively high-achieving 
                                                           
7 Source: The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. 
8 Some may be of the opinion that prior to the accountability exams not enough students were receiving special 
education.  If this opinion is accurate, then perhaps this incentive results in some students being better off.  Still, as 
described earlier in this paper, this will likely cause schools to place in special education at least some students who 
would be better off in other classes.  And since many states have laws that limit the number of students per special 
education teacher, the placement of those students into special education classes who otherwise would not have been so 
placed may require that students who would benefit more from special education be prevented from taking special 
education classes.   14
students with mild dyslexia into the students with disabilities subgroup, who would not have 
otherwise been so classified.   
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Table 1: Over-time changes in test-excluded disability classification rates, six Florida counties 
 
School year  Overall classification 
rate 
Classification rate of 
free-lunch-eligible 
students 
Classification rate of 
non-free-lunch-eligible 
students 
1991-92 7.3%  8.7  6.1 
1992-93 7.8  9.3  6.1 
1993-94 8.1  9.5  6.5 
1994-95 7.8  9.7  5.2 
1995-96 8.8  10.6  6.2 
INTRODUCTION OF TESTING REGIME 
1996-97 9.4  11.0  7.6 
1997-98 9.6  11.8  7.1 
1998-99 10.8  13.2  7.4 
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Table 2: Grade-to-grade transitions in test-exempt disability classification,  
before versus after testing regime introduction  
 






























1  3.0% 3.0% .699  3.5% 3.5% .968  2.3% 2.3% .945 
2  3.2 3.2 .987  4.0 4.0 .817  2.2 2.3 .267 
3  2.7 2.9 .007  3.3 3.8 .000  1.9 1.9 .276 
4  2.0 2.0 .608  2.5 2.6 .466  1.3 1.3 .455 
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Table 3: Estimated effects of testing on disability placement, by socio-economic status 
(robust standard errors in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates) 
 
Specification:  1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Student fixed effects  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Grade fixed effects  YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Standard errors adjusted 
for school level 
clustering 
YES  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
General time trend 
included 
NO  NO YES  YES  NO NO YES  YES 
Separate trends for low-
income and high-income 
students 
NO  NO NO YES  NO NO NO YES 
















Coefficient on testing x 
free lunch eligible 












Number  of  counties  6  6 6 6 2 2 2 2 
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Table 4: Estimated effects of testing on disability placement, by prior mathematics test performance 
(robust standard errors in parentheses beneath coefficient estimates) 
 

















Student fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Grade fixed effects  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Standard errors adjusted 
for school level 
clustering 
YES YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
General time trend 
included 
NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Separate trends for low-
performing and high-
performing students 
NO NO  YES YES NO  YES 
Separate trends for high 
poverty and low poverty 
schools 
NO NO  NO  NO  YES YES 
Student performance-
based separate trends for 
high poverty and low 
poverty schools 
NO NO  NO  NO  NO  YES 












Coefficient on testing x 











Coefficient on testing x 
high poverty school 




Coefficient on testing x 
high poverty school x 
prior year math score 
         -0.013 
(0.005) 
Number of counties  2  2  2  2  2  2 
 